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COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PRIVACY: A CASE FOR ACCURATE AND COMPLETE
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS
THOMAS J. MADDENt AND HELEN S. LESSINtt
The President's Crime Commission in its 1967 report entitled
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society stated that "[an
integrated national information system is needed to serve the
combined needs at the National, State, regional and metropolitan or
county levels of the police, courts, and correction agencies, and of the
public and the research community."'
At that time only ten states in the nation had automated state
level criminal justice information systems.2 By 1976 almost all of the
states had automated information systems in operation. These
systems contain the criminal history records of millions of individ-
uals.3
This information explosion with its greater capacity to gather,
store, process, and transmit criminal justice information has serious
consequences for those who come into contact with the criminal
justice system. The consequences are particularly severe for the
individual who is arrested and who is not subsequently convicted.
As one judge noted in a leading case:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes
known, may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if
no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's
reputation may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may
be both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employ-
ment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent
as a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed
t Assistant Administrator/General Counsel, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, United States Department of Justice. B.E.E., Villanova University,
1964; J.D., Columbus School of Law, Catholic University, 1968.
tt Attorney-Advisor, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States
Department of Justice. B.A., Queens College, 1958; J.D., Washington College of Law,
American University, 1971.
1. Report by the President's Comm. on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice
267 (1967) (Sup. Doc. No. PR 36.8:L41/C86).
2. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1972 Directory of Automated
Criminal Justice Information Systems (Sup. Doc. No. J1.8/2:Au8/972).
3. The number of current criminal history records maintained in the United
States at the state and local level is approximately 195 million. See The American
Criminal HistoryRecord Present Status and Future Requirements, Technical Report
No. 14, SEARCH Group, Inc., Sacramento, Cal. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Technical
Rep. No. 14]. This number includes manual as well as automated files and is in
addition to the 21 million records in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
See Comptroller Gen. of the United States, How Criminal Justice Agencies Use
Criminal History Information, August 1974. There are only 12 million records
required nationally to account for first time and repeat offenders. Technical Rep. No.
14 supra. Therefore, the number of records actually stored indicates that records are
being held in duplicate form in any number of files.
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by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved. An
arrest record may be used by the police in determining whether
subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or whether to
exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an
individual already arrested. Arrest records have been used in
deciding whether to allow a defendant to present his story
without impeachment by prior convictions, and as a basis for
denying release prior to trial or an appeal; or they may be
considered by a judge in determining the sentence to be given a
convicted offender. 4
There have been attempts by some courts to minimize the
adverse impact on the individual arising out of the dissemination of
arrest records. In Paul v. Davis,5 Justice William Brennan observed
in a dissenting opinion that: "A host of state and federal courts,
relying on both privacy notions and the presumption of innocence,
have begun to develop a line of cases holding that there are
substantive limits on the power of Government to disseminate
unresolved arrest records outside the law enforcement system."'6
The adverse impact of unlimited dissemination goes beyond
arrest records to conviction records as well and some states have
enacted laws limiting the dissemination of conviction information
outside the criminal justice system.7 A great deal has been written
with regard to limiting dissemination of all forms of criminal history
record information outside of the criminal justice community, and
the potential harm to the individual from such dissemination has
been well documented . Criminal history record information includes
information collected by criminal justice agencies on individuals
consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests,
detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal
charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, sentencing, correc-
tional supervision, and release. The term does not include intelli-
gence, investigative, or correctional information - probation
reports, evaluative matters, etc.
Over the past number of years there has been much debate
concerning the public's right to know the content of criminal history
4. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
5. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
6. Id. at 735 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., OFFICE OF GEN COUNSEL, U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION (1975).
8. Security and Privacy of Criminal Arrest Records, Hearings on H.R. 13315
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4. J89/1: 92-27 P).
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records and the privacy interests of the individual in limiting the
dissemination of such records outside the criminal justice system. In
the spring of 1975, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) pursuant to a statutory amendment to its enabling
legislation 9 issued regulations which had provisions setting limits
on the dissemination of criminal history information. The dissemi-
nation provisions of the regulations' ° only permitted noncriminal
justice agencies access to criminal history record information where
a statute or executive order expressly referred to criminal conduct
and contained requirements and/or exclusions based upon such
conduct.
After these regulations were issued, strong protest against such
stringent limitations began to surface and LEAA held public
hearings in December of 197511 in which the press, private security
personnel, and employers in varied areas, such as utilities, drug
companies, etc., testified in opposition to the regulations. The major
concerns expressed at the hearings on "dissemination" were on the
need for conviction data for employment, licensing, and other related
purposes, and the potential conflict of the regulations with state
"public record" laws.
The private industry spokesmen who appeared at the hearings
were primarily concerned with the need to know, before the fact,
whether or not a present or prospective employee might constitute a
threat to the lives or property of those with whom he works or to the
public at large.
9. In 1973, the LEAA Act came before Congress for renewal. Senator Kennedy
introduced an amendment to the Act calling for LEAA to assure the security and
privacy of information contained in criminal justice information systems funded by
LEAA. This amendment was enacted into law as section 524(b) of the Crime Control
Act of 1973 and states as follows:
All criminal history information collected, stored, or disseminated through
support under this title shall contain, to the maximum extent feasible,
disposition as well as arrest data where arrest data is included therein. The
collection, storage, and dissemination of such information shall take place under
procedures reasonably designed to insure that all such information is kept
current therein; the Administration shall assure that the security and privacy of
all information is adequately provided for and that information shall only be
used for law enforcement and criminal justice and other lawful purposes. In
addition, an individual who believes that criminal history information concern-ing him contained in an automated system is inaccurate, incomplete, or
maintained in violation of this title, shall, upon satisfactory verification of his
identity, be entitled to review such information and to obtain a copy of it for the
purpose of challenge or correction.
Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3795 (1970)).
10. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(b) (1975).
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Those companies whose employees regularly enter the homes of
customers for the purpose of service calls or installations of
equipments, gas, electric, telephone companies, were particularly
concerned. One spokesman stated:
In connection with its supply of gas and electricity to members
of the general public, this company is vitally concerned in
obtaining and retaining employees of high caliber who do not
have criminal records so that we are in a position to assure
ourselves and our customers that employees of this company
who enter their homes on Company business, e.g., reading of
meters, activating and terminating service, customer relations
contacts, etc., are trustworthy and reliable. Hence, we are
opposed to any limitations being imposed upon us . . . with
respect to obtaining records relating to criminal conduct. 12
Other private industry spokesmen were concerned over court
decisions which appeared to put the burden of responsibility on
private industry for acts committed by their employees under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. A specific case mentioned at the
hearings was the civil judgment awarded in mid-1974 by a U. S.
District Court jury in the District of Columbia13 to a rape victim who
had sued an appliance firm and a trucking firm as a result of the
attack. The assailant, an employee of the trucking company, was
making deliveries for the appliance dealer. To the private firms that
testified at the public hearings, it appeared paradoxical that
employers were being held liable at law for the criminal acts of their
employees, but were unable to review criminal record data in order to
determine potential employees' character, reliability, and history.
Major drug companies, manufacturing and distributing drugs
designated as "controlled substances" by the Controlled Substances
Act 14 advised LEAA that they had serious legal responsibilities
under that statute and under regulations and policies of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) which were being undermined
by their inability to obtain information as to the criminal
convictions of applicants for employment who would have access to
the controlled substances. They pointed out that in order to maintain
12. Id.
13. Lyon v. Carey, 385 F. Supp 272 (D.D.C. 1974). After the jury verdict, a motion
to set aside notwithstanding the judgment was granted by the district court. The court
held that the employee's action was not within the scope of employment. 385 F. Supp.
at 274. On appeal the decision was modified as to defendant trucking company, the
appellate court holding that the action was within the outer bounds of respondeat
superior. 533 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
14. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
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effective controls against the diversion of controlled substances into
other than legitimate channels, the DEA Manual for Drug Security
contained the following section concerning employee screening:
"Pre-employment screening for the purpose of identifying potential
security problems is an important factor when choosing new
employees for work in or around areas where controlled substances
are handled. . . . Criminal background checks with local law
enforcement authorities as well as with BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs] are equally important."
The drug manufacturers pointed out the obvious conflict
between the DEA requirements and the limitations being imposed
upon state and local law enforcement agencies by the LEAA
regulations.
A representative of the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade
submitted for the record the results of its survey concerning the
degree of internal employee thievery in the Metropolitan Washing-
ton area. Of the 106 firms surveyed, 9.4% responded to the
questionnaire. Of those responding, 63.2% indicated known losses
from confessed or apprehended employees in 1973, 1974, and 1975.
The retail firms reported that they had apprehended 1,833 employees
in 1973, 1,841 employees in 1974 and for the first nine months of
1975, 1,693 employees. The known losses attributable to these
apprehended employees were $319,547 in 1973, $230,873 in 1974 and
$377,536 for the first nine months of 1975. The firms reporting
internal losses included those classified as associations, auto repair
shops, communications firms, contracting firms, engineering firms,
hospitals, real estate agencies, rental firms, restaurants, retail shops,
savings and loan associations, schools and transportation firms.
In summary, the hearing record was replete with testimony
regarding employers' need for access to criminal history record
information in order to prevent: 1) Bodily injury caused by
employees and; 2) Theft of money and merchandise.
Of the over 100 persons who either testified or submitted written
comments on the dissemination provisions the record was clear that
there was little, if any, support for the restrictive provisions of the
regulations as they were originally promulgated on May 20, 1975.
However, one of the more significant developments in the hearings
was the fact that most of the representatives of private employers
who appeared and presented statements did not ask for access to
arrest records. These individuals asked only for access to conviction
information. The representative of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company went even further and stated that AT&T
wanted access to conviction records only for individuals being
placed in a sensitive position.
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Faced with a limited statutory mandate and lack of public
support, LEAA revised the regulations. Under the revised regula-
tions, there are no limits on the dissemination of conviction data.
Nonconviction data 15 cannot be disseminated unless authorized by
law, executive order, court rule, order or decision. 16 States are free to
determine appropriate provisions for dissemination of criminal
history record information.1 7 Similar to the earlier regulations, the
revised regulations contemplate that each state will examine its
current practices for the dissemination of criminal history record
information and will add provisions necessary for modifying those
practices which are found to be in the best interests of that
particular state.
While the focus in much public discussion has been that
noncriminal justice access18 to criminal justice information is the
greatest hazard to the individual, the LEAA experience is just one of
the many attempts to limit such access that has met with resistance.
Numerous bills which would have limited dissemination of criminal
history information have been introduced in Congress since 1971,19
and while lengthy hearings have been held numerous times, 2° none
of the bills has ever been voted out of the subcommittees. There have
been similar experiences in many states. In Pennsylvania, the
State's Security and Privacy Plan prepared by the Governor's Task
Force on Criminal Justice Information Systems proposed strict
limits on dissemination and the plan met with great resistance. The
public debate in the summer of 1976 was sharp and divisive and
hearings have since been held to consider legislation governing the
dissemination of criminal history information.
15. 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(k) (1976) states as follows:
"Nonconviction data" means arrest information without disposition if an
interval of one year has elapsed from the date of arrest and no active prosecution
of the charge is pending; or information disclosing that the police have elected
not to refer a matter to a prosecutor, or that a prosecutor has elected not to
commence criminal proceedings, or that proceedings have been indefinitely
postponed, as well as all acquittals and all dismissals.
Id.
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 11,714 (1976) (revising 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(b)).
17. 28 C.F.R. §20.21(c)(3) (1976).
18. Noncriminal justice access refers to any agency or individual not a part of the
official public criminal justice system.
19. See 91st Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 10789, H.R. 10892 and S. 2964 (1969); 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 12574, H.R. 12575/ S. 2963 and S. 4252 (1974); 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., H.R. 61/S. 1428 and H.R. 62/ S. 1427, S. 2008 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:B22/16); Criminal Justice Data Banks -
1974, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:C86/13/974 v.1).
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The LEAA amendment, 21 the Privacy Act of 1974,22 and an
amendment to the law providing appropriations for the FBI,
23
contain the only specific federal statutory pronouncements in this
area. These provisions do not at the present time provide the
national framework necessary to limit dissemination of records.
It is clear that there is no overwhelming support for limiting
dissemination of criminal history record information, and if an
individual is not to be unnecessarily harmed by the dissemination of
criminal history information, it is imperative that we look at what
can be done to provide the degree of security and privacy necessary
for criminal records and assure their integrity.
It must first be noted that by far the greatest use made of
criminal history records is by criminal justice agencies. The
Comptroller General of the United States conducted an investigation
of the uses made of criminal history information. 24 A random sample
of requests for criminal history information over a one-week period
was obtained from data centers maintained by the FBI and the
states of California, Florida and Massachusetts. 25 The study
concluded that by far the greatest use made of this information was
for post-arrest purposes. While some use was made by law
enforcement agencies for records prior to arrest - suspicious
circumstances arousing police interest, followup investigation before
arrest - the uses made for specific post-arrest purposes were of
greater significance. Such uses include: followup investigation after
arrest, prosecution of suspect, plea bargaining, recommending or
setting bail, sentencing, establishment of treatment programs while
21. See note 9 supra.
22. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (Supp. V 1975). Criminal justice
information is addressed by the Act insofar as federal records are concerned, but does
not cover state and local records, nor does it cover federal court records. There is an
exemption which may be utilized by a federal agency to limit the applicability of the
Act's provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (Supp. V 1975).
23. Pub. L. No. 92-544, 86 Stat. 1115 (1972) prohibits the exchange of
identification records by the FBI except with "officials or federally chartered or
insured banking institutions ... and, if authorized by State statute and approved by
the Attorney General, to officials of State and local governments for purposes of
employment and licensing, any such exchange to be made only for the official use of
• . . such official." Id.
24. Comptroller General of the United States, How Criminal Justice Agencies Use
Criminal History Information, August 1974. In March 1974 the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights held hearings on proposed legislation to guarantee the
security and privacy of criminal history record information. The subcommittee
requested that Government Accounting Office determine the extent of the use of
criminal history record information by criminal justice agencies. Hearings on S.2963
& 2964 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess (1974) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:C86/13/974 v.1).
25. This did not include files maintained locally by the criminal justice agencies
of these states but only the state data centers.
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in a correctional institution, parole decisions, and supervision
requirements after release of defendant on parole or probation. The
decisions made by the criminal justice community based upon
criminal history records in each of these areas can be critical. In
1975 approximately sixty-eight million requests were made for
criminal histories by state and local level criminal justice agencies.
Of the criminal histories received 31% had missing data and 10%, it
was estimated, had erroneous information.2 6
It is obvious that reliance on incomplete or inaccurate data can
cause great harm to the individual. Privacy has been defined in
various ways. One of the best definitions, for our purposes, is found
in the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Stand-
ards and Goals Report on Criminal Justice System. The Commission
defines privacy as "protection of the interests of the people whose
names appear for whatever reason in the contents of a criminal
justice information system. '' 27 Protection of such interests will be
enhanced when methods are in place to insure completeness and
accuracy of data. The Commission recommended that the following
methods be established:
1. Every item of information should be checked for accuracy and
completeness before entry into the system. In no event should
inaccurate, incomplete, unclear, or ambiguous data be entered into a
criminal justice information system. Data is incomplete, unclear, or
ambiguous when it might mislead a reasonable person about the
true nature of the information
2. A system of verification and audit should be instituted. Files
must be designated to exclude ambiguous or incomplete data
elements. Steps must be taken during the data acquisition process to
verify all entries. Systematic audits must be conducted to insure that
files have been regularly and accurately updated. Where files are
found to be incomplete, all persons who have received misleading
information should be immediately notified.
Senator Kennedy, the sponsor of the amendment to the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act - section 524(b), 28 - was most
concerned with the inaccuracy and incompleteness of criminal
history record information. One of the most important areas dealt
with by the LEAA regulations implementing section 524(b) involves
insuring completeness and accuracy of criminal history record
26. See Technical Rep. No. 14, supra note 3.
27. U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 114 (1973) (Sup. Doc. No.
Y3.C86:2C86/2).
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information. The regulations define completeness as requiring
dispositions made within the state to be posted to the record held by
state repositories within ninety days of their occurrence.2 9  A
disposition is defined as information disclosing that
criminal proceedings have been concluded, including informa-
tion disclosing that the police have elected not to refer a matter
to a prosecutor or that a prosecutor has elected not to commence
criminal proceedings and also disclosing the nature of the
termination in the proceedings; or information disclosing that
proceedings have been indefinitely postponed and also disclos-
ing the reason for such postponement. Dispositions shall
include, but not be limited to, acquittal,. . . acquittal by reason
of mental incompetence, case continued without finding, charge
dismissed, charge dismissed due to insanity, charge dismissed
due to mental incompetency, charge still pending due to
insanity, charge still pending due to mental incompetence, guilty
plea, nolle prosequi, no paper, nolo contendere plea, convicted,
youthful offender determination, deceased, deferred disposition,
dismissed - civil action, found insane, found mentally incompe-
tent, pardoned, probation before conviction, sentence commuted,
adjudication withheld, mistrial - defendant discharged, execu-
tive clemency, placed on probation, paroled, or released from
correctional supervision 0
An ideal method to provide for complete records would be to
enact mandatory requirements for reporting dispositions to a central
repository of criminal history information and for assuring that
arrest information is not disseminated without available informa-
tion on the disposition of the arrest. The National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended
that such repositories be located at the state level because of
considerable intrastate mobility of offenders.
The regulations encourage the establishment of central state
repositories and provide that in those states which have central state
repositories "procedures shall be established for criminal justice
agencies to query the central repository prior to dissemination of any
criminal history record information to assure that the most up-to-
date disposition data is being used. ' ' 3' Although exceptions are
permitted where manual systems cannot respond quickly enough,
such exceptions apply only until the central state repository can be
upgraded to a level of technical capability that will enable them to
respond in a reasonable time for every inquiry.
29. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(a)(1) (1976).
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The minimum requirements, concerning disposition reporting
and predissemination inquiries to insure the most current records,
are based upon the premise that every state will eventually have a
central repository and that complete records will be stored there and
not in local files. In the event that criminal history records are
maintained in local criminal justice agency files, they are subject to
the requirement that records available for dissemination must
include dispositions to the maximum extent feasible.
The regulations define "accuracy" to mean that no record
containing criminal history record information shall contain
erroneous information. 32 A systematic audit is required by a
repository as a means of insuring the completeness and accuracy of
records. Accuracy checks require controls and inspections on the
input to the system. Audits require entry verification and properly
interpreted source documents. Audit trails 33 are to be established to
guarantee that a maximum level of system accuracy is maintained. 34
The traditional view of computer communications is that this
technological advance will cause a loss of personal liberty because of
the apparently limitless amount of information that can be collected
and disseminated about an individual. Yet this very sophisticated
information technology can lead to improved operations; the ease
with which computers allow access to records has greatly increased
the capability to correct records and will lead to more accurate
recordkeeping. The standards which have been discussed can more
easily be established because of the technological advances. The
ability to maintain up-to-date records, to track dissemination flow so
that any inaccuracies and challenged records can be immediately
corrected, is made more feasible by computerization rather than
manual recordkeeping. Instead of increasing file size and permitting
redundant and obsolete records to exist in many different files
throughout the state, computerization can be used to reduce data
storage.
By 1985, a study has shown, a computerized criminal history
system utilizing central state repositories if established by all fifty
states could reduce the more than 195 million records distributed in
varied criminal justice agencies to about twenty-five million records
in state data centers. 35 A smaller system would permit greater
control over the processing of data. The right of access to these data
32. Id. § 20.21(a)(2).
33. Audit trails are documentation sufficient to enable an auditor to trace the
usages made of the data.
34. 28 C.F.R. §20.21(a)(2) (1976).
35. See Technical Rep. No. 14, supra note 3, at 35.
1200 [VOL. 22: p. 1171
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banks by the individual whose records are maintained therein, so
that he or she may challenge and correct the information being
collected, would establish the integrity of the information more
easily.36  ,
There has been some significant case law at the federal level
dealing with accurate records. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, in the last few years, has spoken
decisively on the issue of accurate records. In Tarlton v. Saxbe,37 the
court held that the FBI had a duty to prevent the dissemination of
inaccurate arrest and conviction records. Safeguarding the accuracy
of these records was of paramount importance. The court stated:
[D]issemination of inaccurate criminal information without the
precaution of reasonable efforts to forestall inaccuracy restricts
the subject's liberty without any procedural safeguards designed
to prevent such inaccuracies .... [G]overnment collection and
dissemination of inaccurate criminal information without
reasonable precautions to ensure accuracy could induce a
levelling conformity inconsistent with the diversity of ideas and
manners which has traditionally characterized our national life
and found legal protection in the First Amendment. 3
The decision was not founded on constitutional grounds but by
an interpretation of the FBI's statutory authority as requiring the
collection and dissemination of accurate information. The case was
remanded to the district court and after a hearing, the district court
held39 that 1) the FBI must forward any challenge concerning the
accuracy of a record to the local agency that submitted the record; 2)
nonserious offenses must be deleted from all FBI criminal records;
and, 3) a feasibility study should be conducted of available systems
and procedures to enable the FBI to keep disposition entries
reasonably current.4 0
36. The Criminal justice Information Systems Regulations require that proce-
dures be established by the state to insure the individual's right to access and review
his criminal history record information for purposes of accuracy and completeness.
The state must provide administrative review and necessary correction of any claim
by the individual to whom the record relates, that the record is inaccurate or
incomplete. The correcting agency must notify all criminal justice recipients of the
corrected information. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(g) (1976).
37. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 1123, 1124 (footnotes omitted).
39. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 407 F. Supp. 1083 (D.D.C. 1976).
40. Id at 1089. As to the first two items, regulations governing the dissemination
of criminal history records provide as follows:
(a) Criminal history record information maintained in any Department of
Justice criminal history record information system shall include serious and/or
significant offenses.
(b) Excluded from such a system are arrests and court actions limited only to
nonserious charges, e.g., drunkenness, vagrancy, disturbing the peace, curfew
1976-1977] 1201
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Other cases of significance dealing with inaccurate records are
Maney v. Ratcliff,4' United States v. Mackey,42 and Shadd v. United
States.4 3 In Shadd v. United States,44 summary judgment was
entered for the petitioner with regard to certain of the allegations
brought by the petitioner of improper entries and inaccuracies in
files. The court held that duplicative listing of certain charges and
the lack of a disposition entry for a charge which had been disposed
of twenty-seven months earlier violated even a minimal definition of
the responsibility to maintain accurate files.
45
In United States v. Mackey_, - - th-e court held that an arrest based
solely upon National Crime Information Center (NCIC) information
which was inaccurate when relayed to state arresting officers 47 and
which had been inaccurate for five months, constituted denial of due
process of law. Evidence seized subsequent to such an arrest and the
basis of a new indictment was therefore suppressed. The court
determined that "a computer inaccuracy of this nature and duration,
even if unintended, amounted to a capricious disregard for the rights
of the defendant as a citizen of the United States.
48
In Maney v. Ratcliff,49 plaintiff was arrested on three different
occasions based upon a stale "fugitive from justice" entry in the
NCIC originating from Baton Rouge, Louisiana authorities. Al-
though no extradition documents were ever forwarded, the entry was
not removed from NCIC by the authorities. The court stated: "These
facts demonstrate that the defendants have caused plaintiff to be
arrested and jailed on three occasions and have not proceeded to
violation, loitering, false fire alarm, nonspecific charges of suspicion or
investigation, traffic violations (except data will be included on arrests for
manslaughter, driving under the influence of drugs or liquor, and hit and run).
Offenses committed by juvenile offenders shall also be excluded unless a juvenile
offender is tried in court as an adult
28 C.F.R. § 20.32 (1976). The exclusions, however, do not apply to the number of
manual records compiled prior to June 1975. However, as the information is converted
from manual to computer, only serious offenses will be maintained. Section 20.34
provides for the individual's right to access criminal history information about
himself contained in the FBI files and provides a procedure for obtaining corrections
of such records. Id. § 20.34.
41. 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
42. 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
43. 389 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 724.
46. 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
47. Id. at 1122. Defendant was hitchhiking when he was stopped by the police.
His name and description was put on the NCIC computer and the return answer
showed an outstanding fugitive warrant for violation of probation. This was the sole
cause of his arrest. During the booking, an illegal firearm was found in the
defendant's duffle bag. Possession of the weapon was the basis of the subsequent
charges. Id.
48. Id. at 1125.
49. 399 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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extradite him by the proper lawful procedures. The violation of
plaintiffs rights by the capricious actions of the defendants
[Louisiana officials] is unquestionable."50
The courts seem clear in their emphasis that due process
requires reliance on accurate records and that where such records
are not accurate, subsequent decisions based upon such records may
be considered defective. With regard to the question of limiting
dissemination of records where the question of accuracy or
completeness has not been an issue, the courts have wrestled with
the problems of prior restraint and the "public's right to know" and
have denied the claims of privacy. In Paul v. Davis,51 the Supreme
Court held that distribution of a flyer captioned "Active Shoplifters"
with names and photographs of an individual arrested but not
convicted for shoplifting could be circulated without violating any
provision of the Constitution. In Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v.
Levi,5 2 a case arising under the Privacy Act of 1974,53 the court
characterized the privacy concerns of indicted or arrested persons to
be minimal and denied the governiaent's contention that the Privacy
Act prohibited disclosure of background information being requested
by Tennessean Newspaper on individuals indicted and arrested for
federal offenses. The court set out a test for determining the validity
of a Privacy Act claim; the threshold question is whether the
potential invasion of privacy involves minimal or substantial
privacy concerns. 54 If the concerns are minimal, disclosure is
mandated. If the concerns are substantial, then the court will employ
a balancing test, weighing the public interest purposes served by
disclosure versus the extent of individual privacy loss.
In the instant case, plaintiff prevailed when the court character-
ized the privacy concerns of indicted or arrested persons to be
minimal. The court flatly stated that such individuals' lives are "no
longer truly private. 55 Thus, the court did not need to balance
competing considerations. The court stated in particular:
Disclosing the requested information about persons arrested or
indicted for federal criminal offenses does not involve substan-
tial privacy concerns. Several factors support this conclusion.
• ..[I]ndividuals who are arrested or indicted become persons in
whom the public has a legitimate interest, and the basic facts
which identify them and describe generally the investigations
50. Id. at 773.
51. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
52. 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
53. 5 U.S.C. §552a (Supp. V 1975).
54. 403 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
55. Id. at 1321.
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and their arrests become matters of legitimate public interest.
The lives of these individuals are no longer truly private. Since
an individual's right of privacy is essentially a protection
relating to his or her private life, this right becomes limited and
qualified for arrested or indicted individuals, who are essentially
public personages.5 6
Another element necessary to safeguard the system is securing
the data centers from unauthorized access. Even if dissemination
were allowed without limit, it would still be necessary to insure that
only authorized personnel could input into the system and retrieve
information from it. Information must be properly processed and
stored in the system. Assuring integrity of the data requires that the
system site, whether manual or computer, have adequate physical
security to protect against any unauthorized personnel gaining
access to the stored data to modify, change, update, or destroy such
information.5 7 Physical security also includes developing procedures
to protect the information from natural or man-made hazards or
disasters. These procedures include screening of personnel, use of
guards, badges, passwords, sign-in logs, as well as designing
facilities to reduce the possibility of physical damage to the
information.
In summary, efficient recordkeeping procedures and manage-
ment which focus upon completeness and accuracy of the records
maintained by criminal justice agencies will provide certain
minimum safeguards necessary to protect the interests of the people
whose records are maintained in a criminal justice information
system and provide that the decisions made, whether by law
enforcement agencies or by nonlaw enforcement agencies, are based
upon accurate and complete records. Comprehensive legislation is
needed to settle the sensitive issues raised by limiting dissemination.
Until Congress deals dispositively with those issues, the main
protection available to an individual is assuring accurate and up-to-
date criminal history record information.
56. Id. (footnote omitted).
57. For further information regarding procedures, see Criminal Justice Computer
Hardware and Software Considerations, Technical Memorandum No. 6, SEARCH
Group, Inc., Sacramento, Cal. (1974).
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